Distinct Cerebral Pathways for Object Identity and Number in Human Infants by Izard, Véronique et al.
Distinct Cerebral Pathways for Object
Identity and Number in Human Infants
Ve ´ronique Izard
1,2,3,4*, Ghislaine Dehaene-Lambertz
1,2,3,5, Stanislas Dehaene
1,2,3,6
1 INSERM, U562, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, F-91191 Gif/Yvette, France, 2 CEA, DSV/I
2BM, NeuroSpin Center, Gif/Yvette, France, 3 Universite ´ Paris-Sud, Orsay, France, 4
Laboratory for Developmental Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America, 5 AP-HP, Service de Neurologie Pe ´diatrique, Ho ˆpital Bice ˆtre,
Kremlin Bice ˆtre, France, 6 Colle `ge de France, Paris, France
All humans, regardless of their culture and education, possess an intuitive understanding of number. Behavioural
evidence suggests that numerical competence may be present early on in infancy. Here, we present brain-imaging
evidence for distinct cerebral coding of number and object identity in 3-mo-old infants. We compared the visual event-
related potentials evoked by unforeseen changes either in the identity of objects forming a set, or in the cardinal of
this set. In adults and 4-y-old children, number sense relies on a dorsal system of bilateral intraparietal areas, different
from the ventral occipitotemporal system sensitive to object identity. Scalp voltage topographies and cortical source
modelling revealed a similar distinction in 3-mo-olds, with changes in object identity activating ventral temporal areas,
whereas changes in number involved an additional right parietoprefrontal network. These results underscore the
developmental continuity of number sense by pointing to early functional biases in brain organization that may
channel subsequent learning to restricted brain areas.
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Introduction
Converging behavioural, brain-imaging, and neurophysio-
logical results suggest that knowledge of number is an evolved
competence of the animal and human brain, with a cortical
basis in bilateral intraparietal cortex [1–8]. The number sense
hypothesis [1] postulates that this cerebral system is available
early on during development, possibly during infancy, and
guides the learning of numerals and arithmetic in childhood.
Indeed, an association of number processing tasks with
intraparietal areas has been demonstrated in 4- and 5-y-old
children [6,9]. At this age, a change in the cardinality of a set
of objects (also called ‘‘numerosity’’) leads to a response in the
right intraparietal cortex, at a location comparable to adults
[4,5]. This response cannot be ascribed to a domain-general
attentional reaction to novelty inasmuch as it is not seen if
the number stays constant while the identity of the objects
changes [6].
It is tempting to speculate that this parietal sensitivity
arises from a predisposition of parietal cortex for spatial and
numerical transformations, possibly present since birth. In
subjects below 4 y of age, however, neuroimaging explora-
tions are limited, and the existence of early numerical
abilities is mostly based on behavioural results. Habituation
and violation-of-expectancy paradigms have revealed a clear
sensitivity to large numbers in 4–6-mo-old infants. For
instance, infants discriminate sets of eight versus 16 dots,
even when nonnumerical parameters such as density and
total surface are tightly controlled [10]. In the range of small
numbers one, two, and three, however, behavioural evidence
remains debated. Initial observations suggested discrimina-
tion in infants and even in newborns [11,12], but more recent
studies demonstrated that this competence was mostly driven
by confounded low-level perceptual dimensions such as
continuous amount of stuff [10,13–15]. Nevertheless, Feigen-
son [16] demonstrated that infants can be driven to attend to
numerosity, even in the range from one to three objects,
when the sets comprise highly distinctive objects rather than
replications of the same object. Moreover, successes at
numerical tasks have been observed when the stimuli to be
compared are presented in different modalities [17–19],
therefore eliminating the possibility of relying on non-
numerical aspects of the stimuli.
Here, we aimed at bringing brain-imaging evidence to bear
on the existence of a dedicated number sense system in early
infancy. Our experiments probed the infant brain for a
speciﬁc response to changes in the cardinal of sets of objects,
distinct for the response to changes in object identity, and
possibly common to small and large numbers. Identifying a
brain response to numerosity in infancy would support the
hypothesis of a developmental continuity in number sense
and signiﬁcantly extend the current evidence for a cerebral
specialization for number, which is currently based almost
exclusively on adult and children data. Only a single brain-
imaging experiment to date has been conducted on infants’
processing of number. Berger et al. [20] used event-related
potentials to investigate the cerebral process underlying
adults’ and 7-mo-olds’ reactions to correct and incorrect
arithmetic operations (1 þ 1 ¼ 2 vs. 1 þ 1 ¼ 1). Compared to
plausible outcomes, arithmetic violations elicited a cerebral
reaction over anterior electrodes both in infants and adults.
Because it emerged from the comparison of two arithmetical
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PLoS BIOLOGYsituations, which differed by their level of plausibility, this
reaction probably indexes a general process of violation
detection, underlying infants’ behavioural response in terms
of looking time to such implausible events.
Our experimental design relied on the habituation
paradigm, which capitalizes on the phenomenon of neural
adaptation: when a stimulus is repeatedly presented, the
response of neural populations encoding this stimulus decays
progressively over successive trials, but it recovers when a
novel item is introduced. In particular, brain areas sensitive
to number increase their activation in response to a change
in number within a block where most stimuli have the same
number [4–6]. Although predominantly used with functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), habituation paradigms
have also been successfully applied to young infants using
event-related potentials (ERPs) [21,22]. We used ERP adapta-
tion to investigate numerical abilities in 3-mo-old infants.
This age is signiﬁcantly younger than what is seen in most
behavioural studies of infant numerical competence, which
typically study 4½- to 6-mo-olds [10,13,18,23–26]. Although a
few studies have reported number discrimination in new-
borns [11,12], these studies did not typically incorporate
sophisticated controls over all nonnumerical parameters such
as size, density, and occupied area.
In addition to probing numerical representation at this
early age, we aimed to study whether the infant brain is
already anatomically and functionally structured. In adults
and 4-y-olds, fMRI adaptation has revealed a double
dissociation between ventral regions sensitive to changes in
object identity, but not in number, and dorsal regions
sensitive to changes in number, but not in object identity
[4,6]. Within the visual system, the ventral pathway is thought
to be primarily concerned with object identity (‘‘what’’), and
the dorsal pathway with object location, size, and motor
affordance (‘‘where’’ and ‘‘how’’) [27]. At 4 mo of age,
behavioural evidence suggests that this basic dorsal/ventral
organization may be already present, since infants are able to
selectively attend either to the identity of objects (e.g., faces)
or to their location, yet fail to link these two types of
information [28]. In line with these results, a brain-imaging
experiment with 6-mo-olds revealed that holding a stimulus
in memory relies on different brain mechanisms, depending
on the nature of the stimuli, and therefore, presumably, the
type of information retained in memory (identity vs. location)
[29]. However, the presence of a ventral/dorsal organization
in infancy has not been tested directly by looking at the
anatomical localization of brain activation.
To address these questions, we recorded event-related
potentials from 3-mo-old infants while they were presented
with a continuous stream of images, each showing a set of
objects. Within a given run, most sets had the same ‘‘stand-
ard’’ cardinality and object identity. However, we occasionally
inserted test images that could differ from the habituation
images in number and/or object identity, thus deﬁning four
types of test stimuli (Figure 1).We compared the visual event-
related potentials evoked by unforeseen changes either in the
identity of objects forming a set, or in the cardinal of this set.
Because of the debated possibility of a discontinuity between
the small and large number ranges, our tests involved both
large and small numbers. Three groups of infants were tested
respectively with a pair of small numbers (two versus three),
distant large numbers (four versus eight), or very distant large
numbers (four versus 12).
Results
Dissociated Responses to Number and Object Changes
We examined the event-related potentials evoked by the
same critical test images, which were deﬁned as deviant or
not, on both the numerical and object-identity dimensions, as
a function of their relation to the context provided by the
preceding images. ERPs showed a series of waveforms
classically observed in infant studies with visual stimuli
[21,30]. We observed two successive occipital negativities
peaking at 88 and 192 ms after image onset, followed by an
ample and long-lasting waveform peaking at 484 ms (P400),
which was positive on posterior electrodes and negative on
anterior electrodes. In order to evaluate the cerebral
responses to changes in number and object identity, we
computed the difference between the deviant number and
standard number test images, and also between the deviant
object and standard object test images. These differences
were tested using a cluster-detection algorithm that detects
spatiotemporal clusters with a consistent statistical difference
over time and space, and assesses their signiﬁcance against re-
randomized data, with a correction for the large search space
(electrodes and time points; see Methods). This cluster
analysis indicated that the introduction of a change in
number or in object identity generated discrimination effects
that modulated the duration and amplitude of the P400.
For number change, a signiﬁcant effect (corrected p ¼
0.044; uncorrected p ¼ 0.0073) was due to more-negative
voltages on number change compared to same-number trials
over a cluster of 13 bilateral parietocentral electrodes (712–
1,196 ms after stimulus onset), and more-positive voltages
over two left frontal electrodes (992–1,196 ms). To further
explore the number-change effect, voltages were averaged on
a 100-ms time window (750–850 ms) and four groups of
electrodes corresponding to the negative and positive
maxima of this effect over parietal and prefrontal areas,
and the symmetrical groups on the other hemisphere (see
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org February 2008 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | e11 0276
Infants Processing Numbers and Objects
Author Summary
Behavioural experiments indicate that infants aged 4½ months or
older possess an early ‘‘number sense’’ that, for instance, enables
them to detect changes in the approximate number of objects in a
set. However, the neural bases of this competence are unknown. We
recorded the electrical activity evoked by the brain on the surface of
the scalp as 3-mo-old infants were watching images of sets of
objects. Most images depicted the same objects and contained the
same number of objects, but occasionally the number or the
identity of the objects changed. As indicated by the voltage
potential at the surface of the scalp, the infants’ brains reacted when
either object identity or number changes were introduced. Using a
3-D model of the infant head, we reconstructed the cortical sources
of these responses. Brain areas responding to object or number
changes are distinct, and reveal a basic ventral/dorsal organization
already in place in the infant brain. As in adults and children, object
identity in infants is encoded along a ventral pathway in the
temporal lobes, although number activates an additional right
parietoprefrontral network. These results underscore the develop-
mental continuity of number sense by pointing to early functional
biases in brain organization.Methods and Figure 2A for the localisation of the electrode
groups). These values were entered in two four-factors
ANOVAs (number size, left vs. right hemisphere, parietal vs.
prefrontal electrode group, and number change or object
change as the last factor). On these electrodes, number
change interacted signiﬁcantly with the electrode group
(F(1,33) ¼ 18.7, p ¼ 0.0001), but object change did not (F ,
1). The effect did not differ signiﬁcantly across hemispheres
(interaction: F , 1) and was signiﬁcant over both the left and
the right electrode groups (left hemisphere: F(1,33)¼21.1, p ,
0.0001; right hemisphere: F(1,33) ¼ 8.3, p ¼ 0.0069). The
number-change effect was also consistent across groups as it
did not interact with number size (F(2,33) , 1) and was
signiﬁcant within each experimental group, including the
small-number group (four vs. 12: F(1,11)¼6.6, p¼0.026; four
vs. eight: F(1,11) ¼ 5.7, p ¼ 0.036; and two vs. three: F(1,11) ¼
7.9, p ¼ 0.017).
Object change also yielded a signiﬁcant effect (corrected p
¼0.035; uncorrected p¼0.0054), but slightly faster and with a
distinct topography including a right anterior negative
cluster (13 electrodes, 672–972 ms) and a bilateral temporo-
occipital positive cluster (ten electrodes, 636–868 ms). Similar
to the analysis of the number effect, an ANOVA was
performed on the voltage averaged during the same 100-ms
time window and on four groups of electrodes (two groups
located at the maxima of the dipole of the object-change
response on occipital and central areas, and their sym-
metrical counterparts; see Figure 2B for the localisation of
the electrode groups). On these electrodes, object change
interacted with electrode localization (F(1,33) ¼ 13.1, p ¼
0.001), whereas number change did not (F(1,33) ¼ 1.2, p ¼
0.28). Voltages were more negative for deviant objects on
central electrodes, and more positive on occipitotemporal
electrodes. This effect did not interact with hemisphere
(F(1,33) ¼ 1.4 p ¼ 0.24), and it reached signiﬁcance over both
the left and the right electrode groups (left hemisphere:
F(1,33) ¼ 7.0, p ¼ 0.012; right hemisphere: F(1,33) ¼ 16.9, p ¼
0.00024). The object change effect also did not interact with
number size (F(2,33)¼1.4, p¼0.26). However, further analyses
revealed a signiﬁcant response to object change only in the
two groups that saw the smallest numbers (two versus three
group: F(1,11)¼6.7, p¼0.025; four versus eight group: F(1,11)
¼13.4, p¼0.004); but not in the four versus 12 group (F , 1).
A likely interpretation is that objects were presented at a
Figure 1. Schematic Description of the Experimental Protocol
Infants were presented with a continuous stream of images, each depicting a set of objects. Within a given block, all habituation stimuli shared the
same SN and object identity. Occasionally, a test stimulus was inserted that could differ in number and/or object identity. We only report ERPs to those
test stimuli, averaged separately for standard versus deviant number trials, and for standard versus deviant object trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0060011.g001
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harder to discriminate (see [4] for a similar observation).
Together, these results establish a double dissociation
between the processing of number and of object identity at
the scalp level: some electrode groups show an effect of
number change, but not of object change, whereas others
show the converse response. The dissociation indicates that
neither of these responses can be ascribed solely to domain-
general mechanisms such as attention to novel events.
Cortical Sources
Although event-related potentials have low spatial reso-
lution, they can provide coarse information about brain
localization, particularly given the dense sampling of the
infant head provided by our 65-electrode net. We took
advantage of the anatomical images obtained from our
previous magnetic resonance experiments with infants
[31,32] to compute a detailed model of the infant head and
cortical folds (see Figure 3). We then used this forward model
to reconstruct a plausible distribution of the cortical origins
of our scalp recordings, using distributed cortical source
modelling and a minimum norm constraint (see Methods).
The reconstructed activations, while probably accurate only
to within 1 or 2 cm, indicated a double dissociation of
number and object identity at the cortical level (see Figure 3).
Object change activated a stream of left ventral temporal
regions, starting in posterior occipitotemporal regions
around 300–400 ms and with a durable activation up to
800–1,000 ms in anterior temporal as well as posterior
occipitotemporal regions. Conversely, number change led to
the activation of a right network pertaining to the dorsal
pathway, including the right inferior parietal and right
inferior frontal region. We also observed effects of number
change in temporal regions. An antagonistic relation was
observed whereby number change led to a decrease in the left
anterior temporal regions previously associated with object
change, and a concomitant increase in right anterior
temporal activation (see Figure 3).
Comparison across Small and Large Number Ranges
We found a response common to small and large numbers
on the scalp; we also searched the data for possible differ-
Figure 2. Scalp-Measured Responses to Number Change and to Object Change
(A and B) Upper panels show the topography of the difference between the deviant and standard conditions, averaged between 750 to 850 ms after
stimulus onset ([A] shows the response to number change; [B] shows the response to object change). Dots mark the location of the electrodes used for
ANOVA. Histograms depict effect sizes averaged across these electrodes, for three different groups of infants respectively exposed to numbers two
versus three, four versus eight, or four versus 12 (an asterisk [*] indicates p , 0.05). Lower graphs show the time course of voltage averaged over the
groups of electrodes used in the ANOVAs. Arrows indicate stimulus onsets (every 1,500 ms).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0060011.g002
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the number-change effect varied with the range of numbers
tested. An ANOVA was run on a larger time window (650–
1,250 ms) spanning the whole duration of the effect as
identiﬁed by the cluster analysis, on the groups of electrodes
deﬁned by the number-related analysis, including the same
factors as previously analyzed (number size, hemisphere,
electrode group, and number change) and a supplementary
factor of time (six successive 100-ms–long time windows). The
effect (interaction between electrode group and number
change) did not interact with time or with number size (all Fs
, 1), even when the two groups of infants that were presented
with large numerosities were grouped together (Fs , 1). A
cluster analysis directly comparing the responses to number
Figure 3. Cortical Source Reconstructions
(A and B) The sources of the deviant–standard differences are presented on a 3-mo-old 3-D brain at 832 ms after stimulus onset. Time courses were
extracted from different brain areas for standard and deviant conditions. In the deviant object condition (B), areas of the left temporal lobe were more
activated than in the standard object condition. In the deviant number condition (A), a right parietoprefrontal network was activated, in addition toa
right anterior temporal response. Number change also led to a deactivation in the left temporal areas responding to object deviance, perhaps because
the introduction of a number deviant inhibited the mechanisms encoding object deviance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0060011.g003
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versus the large-number range (four versus eight and four
versus 12 groups) also did not identify any effect (corrected p
. 0.42, uncorrected p . 0.11). Thus, our data do not show any
discontinuity between small and large numbers.
Discussion
By looking at brain electrical activity in 3-mo-old infants,
our results establish a double dissociation between number
and object identity processing. Visual evoked potentials were
recorded as infants were presented with images of sets of
objects, most of them depicting the same number of the same
objects, but with occasional deviants in object identity and/or
number. At the scalp level, some electrode groups showed an
effect of number change, but not of object change, whereas
others showed the converse response. Those brain responses
reveal that infants are sensitive to both object identity and
number by age 3 mo. For object identity, our results merely
provide additional support to a considerable amount of
previous behavioural evidence for visual object processing in
infancy, including in newborns [33–35]. For number, how-
ever, our experiment goes beyond previous behavioural
research by demonstrating numerical discrimination at an
age younger than most previous reports [10,13,18,25,26], and
by including strict controls over nonnumerical parameters
that were typically lacking in previous experiments at this age
[12,24].
The observed dissociation between object identity and
number is particularly crucial for the interpretation of the
functional role of the observed brain responses. It indicates
that neither of them can be ascribed solely to domain-general
mechanisms such as attention to novel events. Detection of
rare events has been associated with a series of late waveforms
in infants, and particularly a large negative deﬂection
culminating 400–800 ms after stimulus onset on the anterior
electrodes (Nc) [36–38]. Similarly, Berger et al. [20] observed a
negative anterior waveform when 7-mo-old infants watched a
movie that included an arithmetic violation (1þ1¼1o r2 1
¼2). Although direct comparison of these results with ours is
made difﬁcult by the occasional use of different references
for voltages, the domain-general Nc response bears some
resemblance with the response we observed after changes of
objects, which includes a negative component on frontal
electrodes. The response to changes in number, however, is
clearly distinct from this domain-general Nc. Our source
analysis further suggests that neither of these components
originates solely from an anterior attention network, which is
considered to be the source of the Nc component [37], but
that both our responses involve distributed and distinctly
located sources.
The observed dissociation between object- and number-
based responses also allows us to exclude simple interpreta-
t i o n so fo u rr e s u l t sa sa r t e f a c t so ft h ee x p e r i m e n t a l
procedure. In particular, although parents were allowed to
see the stimuli, it is very unlikely that the reaction we
observed was a reaction to a parental signal rather than a
reaction to our stimuli. First, the onset of the brain reaction
occurred before 500 ms, which leaves little time for a whole
chain of parental reaction, parent-to-infant signalling, and
infant brain activation to occur. Second, most crucially, given
the dissociation in ERPs associated with number and object
change, it seems very improbable that all parents would have
differentiated the two types of changes in a consistent way so
as to elicit, through an unknown, yet differentiated feedback,
a consistently distinct brain response in all infants.
Dorsal and Ventral Pathways in Infants
Although they should be interpreted cautiously, as they
represent only a tentative model with coarse spatial accuracy,
our source reconstructions suggest, at a minimum, that
distinct cortical pathways already exist in 3-mo-old infants
for processing number and object identity. The sources of the
object-change effect were located along the left temporal
cortex, with an antagonistic response in the right temporal
cortex. These results mesh well with fMRI observations from
children and adults, where object-change responses have
been recorded in the inferotemporal cortex, particularly in
the left hemisphere [4,6]. In the present experiment, objects
were deﬁned both by their shape and by their colour, and
therefore the observed response to object change could
involve lower-level colour- and shape-sensitive areas as well as
object-sensitive areas. Indeed, examination of the source
reconstruction results brings support to this interpretation,
since an entire stream of ventral occipitotemporal areas was
activated in cascade in response to the presentation of
deviant objects. The posterior areas, which responded ﬁrst,
might have encoded low-level features of the stimuli such as
shape or colour, whereas the later activation of more anterior
areas might relate to an encoding of object identity. Note,
however, that the surface ERP component responding to
object change was probably not sensitive solely to changes in
colour, since it did not appear in the large-number condition
in which the objects were smaller and therefore hardly
discriminable in shape, but still markedly different in colour.
In contrast to changes in object identity, changes in
number activated a parietoprefrontal network in the right
hemisphere. Although bilateral areas have been associated
with number processing in adults, the present lateralization
to the right hemisphere is consistent with previous studies
that suggest a greater right lateralization of intraparietal
responses to number in 4-y-olds than in adults [6]. The
activation of the left inferior parietal region increases with
age in older children [39,40], and our results suggest that it
might not be dominant in the ﬁrst year of life.
In addition to activating a right parietoprefrontal network,
changes in number elicited a decreased response within the
left temporal region that was responsive to object change (as
well an increase in the opposite right temporal region). This
aspect of our results suggests that there may be an
antagonistic relation between the dorsal network for number
and space and the ventral network for object identity.
Although unexpected, this tentative conclusion meshes well
with several previous behavioural studies that observed a
drop in infants’ performance when object identity and either
numerical or spatial information have to be jointly processed
and integrated. For instance, Xu [41] and Xu and Carey [42]
observed that infants were unable to use object-identity
information to infer numerosity: when two distinct objects
emerged successively from behind an occluder, infants were
clearly able to discriminate these two objects, but they were
not surprised if the occluder later dropped to reveal just one
object. Furthermore, Mareschal and Johnson [28] explicitly
demonstrated a competition between memory for object
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(‘‘‘where’’‘) depending on the category of visual stimuli used.
When the stimuli were faces, infants detected changes in their
identity, but not their position, whereas when they were
manipulable toys, infants detected changes in location, but
not in identity [28]. Furthermore, Southgate et al. [29]
observed a dissociation in the brain responses of 6-mo-old
infants as they were holding either a toy or a face in memory.
These results, together with our source localizations, support
the hypothesis that during infancy, information pertaining to
the ‘‘‘what’’‘ and ‘‘‘where’’‘ pathways is already processed by
distinct networks that are initially not fully integrated in a
coherent behaviour, but rather may interact according to an
antagonistic mode. Further research will be needed to
conﬁrm this antagonistic effect and probe the roles of
attention, language, and prefrontal cortex development in
overcoming it. Some researchers have suggested that a full
integration may not occur until much later during childhood
[43].
Developmental Continuity of Number Representations in
the Dorsal Pathway
Our results, which are based on a measure of infant
cerebral activity, differ in part from previous conclusions
based on behavioural results. We observed a shared brain
response to numerical changes in both small (two vs. three)
and large (four vs. eight and four vs. 12) number ranges. This
ﬁnding is in apparent conﬂict with previous behavioural
results suggesting that even 6-mo-old infants are unable to
discriminate small numbers two and three when nonnumer-
ical parameters are appropriately controlled [13,44,45], and
are unable to discriminate ratios of 2:3, even in the large-
number range, until 9 mo of age [46].
At this age, infants are thought to possess two separate
systems conveying numerical information in the small- (,4)
and large-number range, respectively. In the large-number
range, numbers are represented by analogical internal
magnitudes. In the small-number range, infants track sets of
one to three items by means of attentional indexes attached
to each object, and they can use one-to-one correspondence
on these indexes to detect the absence or sudden apparition
of objects [13,47]. With respect to this theoretical back-
ground, our results raise three questions: (1) why did we
observe a capacity of the dorsal system to respond to both
small and large numbers? (2) why did we not observe a
distinct brain response to small numbers? and (3) why do
brain measures seem to be more sensitive than behavioural
measures?
A Shared System Dealing with Both Small and Large
Numbers
Although behavioural results demonstrate the existence of
a speciﬁc system for small numbers, no published study
contradicts our present ﬁndings that the system of analog
magnitude representation, which underlies infants’ numer-
ical competence for large numbers, can also respond to small
numbers. In fact, many adult and animal studies reveal a
continuity in behaviour between small and large numbers,
suggesting that the analog system extends to small numbers.
For instance, Cordes et al [48] found the same Weber
signature across small and large numbers in a task adapted
from the animal literature, in which human adults were
required to tap a given number of times without counting.
Contrary to the prediction of the small number system,
responses showed some variability in the small-number range,
in continuity with the large-number range. In tapping tasks,
animals show a similar behaviour, with no discontinuity
between small and large numbers [49]. In infants, a set-size
signature characteristic of the object tracking system is
obtained mostly in one type of task in which items are shown
successively or retrieved successively from a box [50,51].
Hauser et al. [52] observed a similar set-size limit in untrained
rhesus monkeys tested with a single trial in semiwilderness,
but Beran [53] found no such discontinuity when using a
similar task with multiple trials in trained laboratory animals:
monkeys could select the larger of two sets based on their
number, with a ratio-dependent performance and no
discontinuity between small and large numbers. Under
conditions of simultaneous presentation of a set of objects,
as tested in the present work, monkeys’ analog representation
always appear to extend to small numbers. For instance,
Brannon and Terrace [54,55] observed ratio-based general-
ization from small to large numbers: after having been
trained on the comparison of small quantities (one to four),
rhesus monkeys were able to generalize this training to larger
numbers (up to nine).
At the brain level, neurons sensitive to numerosity have
been found in the intraparietal sulcus as well as in the
prefrontal lobe of monkeys. These neurons encode quantities
from one to 30 objects and show a seamless increase in their
tuning width with numerosity, corresponding to Weber’s law,
without any sign of a discontinuity at the boundary between
numbers smaller or larger than three [7,56]. Similar observa-
tions have recently been made in another population of
number-sensitive neurons located in lateral intraparietal area
[57]. Our results accord with these observations, and suggest
that human infants share with nonhuman primates an analog
representation of numerosities that extends seamlessly across
small and large numbers alike.
Absence of Brain Correlates of the Small-Number System
Given the behavioural evidence for a distinct small-number
system in infancy, one might wonder why we did not observe
an additional cerebral response in the small-number range.
Several aspects of our design might have precluded this
possibility, however. First, behavioural results show that
infants can discriminate small numbers via an object tracking
system, but that this competence disappears when the objects
are identical and nonnumerical aspects of the sets, such as
object size and density, are controlled for [58]. These factors
were tightly controlled for in the present experiment, and
thus our design may have effectively cancelled any response
of the small-number system. Second, even if this system had
been reactive, the neural habituation method that we used
may not be appropriate to detect it. Repetition suppression
occurs in neural populations tuned to the stimulus value
presented repeatedly during the habituation phase. Thus, the
habituation method is most appropriate to detect neural
populations that encode an explicit representation of the
dimension being tested. The object tracking system, however,
is thought to represent numerical information only in an
implicit way: in this system, there is no summary representa-
tion of ‘‘two’’; instead, infants form a mental model of two
objects by recruiting two attentional indexes or ‘‘object ﬁles’’
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suppression effect and may remain invisible to the neural
habituation method. In brief, our experiment was not
targeted at detecting the cerebral bases of an object tracking
mechanism. Consequently, the absence of a speciﬁc effect for
small numbers in our results does not exclude the existence
of such system, which may perhaps be detected by other
means.
Contrasting Cerebral and Behavioural Measures
Finally, our event-related potentials revealed a capacity for
discriminating numerosity, whereas behavioural studies
typically show infants failing in similar conditions. Hence,
although we observed a positive reaction to changes in
number in brain activity, 5-mo-old infants are not able to
discriminate numerosities when images were presented at the
rate of one every 1,500 ms as here, but needed a longer
presentation of 2,000 ms to succeed in a behavioural
experiment [26]. Furthermore, we observed a reaction for
numbers separated by a ratio of 2:1 (four vs. eight) and even
3:2 (three vs. two), although positive discrimination of 3:2
ratios is not achieved until 9 mo of age in behavioural
measures [10,46]. Whereas behaviour is often a composite
measure reﬂecting the combined effects of several processing
stages, brain measures can provide a purer index of a given
level of representation [61] and can track the response of a
given system even when it does not lead to an overt
behavioural response. Many examples of ERP-behaviour
dissociations exist in the adult literature. For instance, high-
density ERPs demonstrate a series of processing stages of
subliminal visual stimuli that subjects deny seeing [62]. In a
training task where subjects learn to attend to subtle phonetic
differences, ERP evidence for stimulus discrimination (mis-
match negativity) may appear as much as 24 h before a
change in overt behaviour occurs [63]. These experiments
exemplify the fact that cerebral measures can be more
sensitive than behavioural measures.
A second factor, more speciﬁc perhaps to the develop-
mental context, is that when a conﬂict exists between several
levels of representations, infants and young children may lack
the ability to resolve the conﬂict and integrate all of their
sources of knowledge into a coherent behaviour. As a result,
behavioural measures may not fully reﬂect the infant’s
competence. For instance, in the classical object permanence
task, infants appear to lack knowledge of hidden objects when
tested with reaching measures, but not when tested with
looking time or eye-orienting methods [34,35,64,65]. In the
case of small numbers, object-tracking representations may
be so salient that they determine behaviour even when the
analog quantity system is in possession of more-advanced
information concerning numerical quantity. As discussed
above, object identity and set numerosity pertaining to the
ventral and the dorsal pathway may be not fully integrated
during infancy. Furthermore, ERP responses to object and
number change occur relatively late, with a peak around 800
ms, much later than the discrimination responses observed at
the same age with auditory phonetic stimuli (around 200–400
ms for phonetic mismatch [22]) or visual faces (around 300 to
700 ms [38,66]). This slowness, perhaps related to the small
size of the objects presented, may explain that numerical
competence is not always expressed in behavioural measures
such as looking time, which may be driven by faster
computations of more salient perceptual dimensions. In
particular, stimuli need to remain present for a longer time
in order for infants to react to number [26]. Whereas ERP
measures detect the on-line brain response to numerosity,
more time may be needed for this response to guide overt
behaviour.
We should also underscore the fact that although the
stimuli used in behavioural and ERPs experiments can be
similar, the constraints related to each type of procedure lead
to important differences in experimental settings. Whereas
behavioural results are based on a few measures obtained
after several minutes of habituation to one type of stimulus,
we recorded ERP to tens of object and number changes
embedded in a continuous ﬂow of standard stimuli. Such fast
recurrent presentation provides more evidence to the infant
about the value of the standard numerosity, and repeated
measurements may also confer a greater sensitivity to ERP
experiments. Both factors may ultimately explain why we
observed a reaction to numbers separated by a smaller ratio
(2:3), and presented at a faster pace.
Conclusion
Altogether, our results reveal a system representing both
small and large numbers in infancy. They suggest devel-
opmental continuity, with a right parietal involvement for
number and a basic ventral/dorsal organization already
present at 3 mo of age. The parietal number system may
constitute the neural substrate of infants’ initial numerical
competence, which increases in precision in the course of
development and possibly guides the acquisition of arith-
metic and more elaborate mathematical concepts.
Methods
Stimuli. High-density ERPs were recorded while infants were
presented with a continuous stream of images, each depicting a set of
colourful animal-like objects on a black background. Stimuli were
projected onto a screen measuring 100 3 80 cm, and the infant was
seated on a caretaker’s lap at an approximate distance of 80 cm from
the screen. Two categories of stimuli were used, respectively labelled
‘‘habituation’’ and ‘‘test.’’ Within a block, all habituation stimuli had
the same number and depicted the same object. Test stimuli
occasionally differed from the habituation stimuli in their number
and/or in the identity of the object used, thus deﬁning four types of
test stimuli (see Figure 1).
Control over nonnumerical parameters. In habituation experi-
ments, it is important to control for nonnumerical parameters, such
as the position of the objects and the physical parameters of the
image, in order to ensure that a positive result can only be attributed
to the discrimination of numbers rather than to the variation of any
nonnumerical parameter. We applied a strategy similar to previous
publications [4–6,10,67].
The stimuli were automatically generated using a variant of our
laboratory’s numerosity stimulus generation programs, which are
described in depth at http://rd.plos.org/pbio.0060027 (78 KB DOC).
The position of the objects and the physical parameters of the image
(intensive parameters: object surface size, average area devoted to
each object; extensive parameters: total luminance, total occupied
area) varied across stimuli, following different rules for the
habituation and test stimuli. For the test stimuli, on the one hand,
the extensive parameters of the display (total luminance and total
occupied area) were kept constant on average. Therefore, if infants
encoded some extensive parameter of the stimuli rather than the
cardinality of the sets, they would have the same reaction to all test
stimuli. For the habituation stimuli, on the other hand, intensive
parameters were kept constant on average. They were completely
uncorrelated to number, as they were randomly drawn from a
uniform distribution, ideally ranging between the minimal and
maximal value these parameters take for the test stimuli (see Figure
S1). If infants only encoded some intensive parameter of the stimuli,
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numerical habituation context.
In the analysis of the results, we considered the difference between
deviant and standard test stimuli in various numerical contexts,
where two numerosities took alternatively the roles of deviant and
standard numerosity. Reactions to intensive parameters would
generate effects depending only on the numerosity of the test
stimulus presented, not on the numerical habituation context (no
effect of the deviant/standard factor). On the other hand, reactions to
extensive parameters would be the same over all test stimuli,
independent of their numerosity. Therefore, reactions to the
number-change factor can only be imputed to numerosity, and not
to the low-level attributes of the stimuli.
Procedure. The total experiment consisted of eight blocks of 16
trials each, in which each trial consisted in the initial presentation of
a variable number of habituation stimuli (two to ﬁve images) followed
by a single test stimulus. Within each block, images were presented
continuously, at the rate of one image every 1,500 ms, and no cue
indicated the presence of a test stimulus or the beginning of a new
trial. When the infant looked away from the screen, the experiment
was stopped, the infant’s gaze was attracted to the screen, and then
additional habituation stimuli were presented before a test stimulus
appeared.
The experiment ended after eight blocks, or when the infant
showed signs of fussiness.
Throughout the whole experiment, each infant was presented with
two different numbers whose respective roles (either deviant or
standard)switchedeachtimeanewblockstarted.Threedifferentpairs
of numbers were used in three different groups of infants: very distant
large numbers (four versus 12), distant large numbers (four versus
eight), and small numbers (two versus three). In order to maximize the
infants’attention,ineachoftheeightblocksanewstandardobjectwas
selected. The deviant object was chosen so that its shape and colour
would be maximally different from the standard object.
Participants. Thirty-six healthy infants were included (14 females;
mean age 103 d, range 92 to 124 d). Additional infants were rejected
because of fussiness (77), excessive movements (31), excessive sweating
artefacts (6), electrode net degradation (16), or other technical failure
(3). The study was approved by the regional ethical committee for
biomedical research, and parents gave their written informed
consent.
ERP recording and signal processing. Electroencephalography
(EEG) was digitized continuously at 250 Hz using a 65-electrode
geodesic electrode net (EGI) referred to the vertex. The recording was
ﬁrst digitally ﬁltered between 0.5 and 20 Hz. For each trial, we then
extracted an epoch starting 400 ms before the presentation of the test
stimulus and lasting 2,000 ms after the onset of the test stimulus.
Electrodes contaminated by eye or motion artefacts were automati-
cally rejected, and trials with more than 25 contaminated electrodes
were rejected. The remaining trials (on average 61.6 per participant;
range 30 to 148) were averaged to obtain ERPs in each of four trial
types (DN: deviant number; SN: standard number; DO: deviant object;
SO: standard object). Note that experimental design crossed the two
variables of number change and object change, so that in principle, we
could have computed ERPs within smaller subcategories of trials (e.g.,
DN with or without a concomitant change in object identity). In
practice, however, too few trials were available, so that only the main
effects of object change and number change could be studied. ERP
averageswere digitallytransformed to anaveragereference, corrected
for eventual slow artefacts by removing a linear trend on the whole
segment, baseline corrected on the 200 ms preceding the onset of the
test stimulus, and ﬁnally spatially smoothed by convolution with a
Gaussian, with a standard deviation corresponding to the distance
between electrodes on an infant’s head, e.g., about 1.5 cm.
Statistical analysis: Randomization procedure and ANOVAs. In
order to evaluate the cerebral responses to changes in number and
object identity, we computed the difference between the DN and SN
test images, and also between the DO and SO test images. Computing
these differences cancelled out all the brain activity resulting from
processes that are common between the two conditions, such as low-
level perceptual processes, or processes resulting from the presenta-
tion of the previous habituation stimuli.
A customized cluster analysis coupled with a randomization
procedure was used to identify effects and assess their level of
signiﬁcance after correction for the large number of electrodes and
time points tested. The two conditions of interests were ﬁrst
compared separately, using Wilcoxon signed-rank test, for each
electrode and each time sample. Levels of probability obtained were
normalized into Z-scores, and then thresholded at 61.96 (p ¼ 0.05
two-tailed). These thresholded values were used to deﬁne spatiotem-
poral clusters of activation present for an extended time period and
on contiguous electrodes. The entire time period extending between
the onset of the test stimulus and the onset of the next habituation
stimulus (1,500 ms) was used to detect the clusters. First, our
procedure pooled above-threshold samples corresponding to spa-
tially contiguous electrodes or adjacent time samples, separately for
positive and negative above-threshold Z-scores, thus deﬁning several
positive and negative clusters. Each cluster was then attributed a
weight equal to the sum of the absolute value of the Z-scores of all of
its constitutive samples. Because our data were transformed to an
average reference, signiﬁcant effects were expected to present two
near-simultaneous ERP components of opposite signs over two
distinct electrode sets. Therefore, for each time sample, the total
effect strength was measured as the sum of the weights of the largest
positive and negative clusters that were found at this time.
To evaluate the signiﬁcance of the effects obtained, we then
recomputed the same analysis on 5,000 sets of randomly permuted
data, for which no signiﬁcant effect is expected. A permutation was
deﬁned by randomly attributing the label ‘‘deviant’’ or ‘‘standard’’ to
the two conditions of interest for each subject. For each permutation,
we extracted the distribution of effect strength (number of pairs of
clusters of each strength), as well as the value of the maximum effect
strength for the total time interval. Uncorrected p-values were
obtained by averaging the distribution of effect strength over all the
permutations, and then taking the rank of the real experimental data
within this average distribution. Similarly, corrected p-values were
given by the rank of the experimental data within the distribution of
the maximal effect strength, divided by the total number of
permutations [68].
The previous method allowed selecting the time windows and
clusters of electrodes that were signiﬁcantly affected by our
experimental conditions. Possible effects of group and hemisphere
on these effects were further explored with analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) in order to assess (1) the consistency of the effect over
different groups, (2) the independence of responses to number
changes and object changes, and (3) possible asymmetries in the
cerebral response. Voltages were extracted for each of the four
experimental conditions (DN, SN, DO, and SO) within symmetrical
groups of electrodes and a ﬁxed time window (750–850 ms), identiﬁed
by the above cluster analysis as a common window for number and
object change effects. The electrode groups chosen corresponded to
the six electrodes located at the negative and positive maxima of the
effect, as well as their symmetrical electrodes (identical to themselves
for medial electrodes). This way, two symmetrical groups of ten
parietal electrodes and 12 prefrontal electrodes were deﬁned for the
number-change effects; and two groups of ten occipital electrodes
and 12 central electrodes were deﬁned for the object-change effect.
Average voltages were then entered into two distinct ANOVAs testing
respectively for numerical change and object change, with one
between-subject factor (number size: 2/3, 4/8, and 4/12) and three
within-subject factors of hemisphere, electrode group localization,
and deviance (change or no change). Finally, in order to evaluate the
possibility that these number pairs caused deviancy effects at
different moments in time, another ANOVA, with a supplementary
factor of time, tested six successive 100-ms–long time windows (from
650 to 1,250 ms).
Source modelling. Cortical current density mapping was obtained
using a distributed model consisting of 10,000 current dipoles. Dipole
locations and orientations were constrained to the cortical mantle of
a generic head and brain model built from a 3-mo-old infant MRI
anatomy using the BrainVisa software package (http://brainvisa.info/).
The geometry of the EEG sensor net was then warped to the head
mesh. EEG forward modelling was computed using an overlapping-
sphere analytical model in which all sphere and conductivity
parameters were adjusted to the typical tissue properties of the
infant head [69]. Cortical current maps were computed from the EEG
time series using a linear inverse estimator (weighted minimum-norm
current estimate). All these procedures were conducted with the
BrainStorm Matlab toolkit (http://neuroimage.usc.edu/brainstorm).
Supporting Information
Alternative Language Abstract S1. French Translation of Abstract by
VI
Found at doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0060011.sd001 (21 KB DOC).
Figure S1. Distribution of the Nonnumerical Parameters of the
Stimuli
Schema illustrating how the physical parameters of the stimuli were
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Infants Processing Numbers and Objectscontrolled. Values corresponding to the pair of large distant
numbers (four vs. 12) are given as an example. Left, control over
the luminance of individual items (intensive parameter) versus of
the whole display (extensive parameter). The total luminance stayed
constant for all the test stimuli, independent of their number,
whereas the intensive parameter (surface size of the objects) was
constant on average for habituation stimuli. Thus, the average
amount of change in the size of the objects was exactly the same on
standard trials, where the numerosity at test equals the numerosity
during habituation, than on deviant trials, where they differ. If we
observe a signiﬁcant cerebral response to number changes (differ-
ence between deviant number and standard number), this result can
only be explained by number change and not by object size or total
luminance. Right, similar control over total occupied area (extensive
parameter) versus mean area occupied by each object (intensive
parameter). In this case, a supplementary variability was introduced
in the images, as the positions of the objects were chosen randomly
by a program to make the arrays look irregular. Despite this
variability, controls ensured that (1) test stimuli were minimally
variable across numerosities in terms of total occupied area; (2) the
test stimuli were not systematically more similar to the habituation
stimuli of the same numerosity, as compared to stimuli of a
different numerosity.
Found at doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0060011.sg001 (88 KB DOC).
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